Anonymity-enhancing assets or unattributed transfers are barred outright, or barred for regulated firms.
What The third-party doctrine actually says
Any account of US financial privacy that stops at statutes misses the layer that actually decides things. Because records handed to a third party carry no constitutional protection, chain analysis combined with a subpoena to the exchange is a lawful warrantless route from an address to a name. The Fifth Circuit blessed exactly that sequence in 2020, noting that agents used a commercial clustering vendor and then served a grand jury subpoena on Coinbase rather than seeking a warrant. The First Circuit followed in 2024, and the Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal in June 2025. The 2018 cell-site decision narrowed the doctrine for location data while leaving the financial records line untouched. This floor has not moved.
The instruments that matter
- United States v. Miller (1976) and Smith v. Maryland (1979)
- information voluntarily conveyed to a third party carries no reasonable expectation of privacy, the foundation for subpoenaing exchange records
- United States v. Gratkowski (5th Cir., 30 June 2020)
- no reasonable expectation of privacy in Bitcoin blockchain records or in Coinbase account records; agents used clustering analysis plus a grand jury subpoena rather than a warrant
- Carpenter v. United States (2018)
- narrowed the doctrine for historical cell-site location data as qualitatively different, while expressly preserving Miller
- Harper v. Werfel (1st Cir., 24 September 2024)
- Coinbase account information falls squarely within the third-party doctrine; certiorari denied 30 June 2025
What this means for confidential transactions
Bubble is built for exactly this shape of obligation: amounts and balances live on chain as ciphertexts, computation happens without decryption, and the only disclosure path is an on-chain access list through which an authorized party - an auditor, a supervisor, a counterparty - can request scoped decryption. That is confidentiality from the public, not from the regulator.
Related entries
- FinCENAmericas · Bank Secrecy Act · the deepest US constraint
- GENIUS ActAmericas · Stablecoins · censorability as a licensing precondition
- IRS broker reportingAmericas · Tax · live at the custodial perimeter, dead beyond it
- NYDFSAmericas · The most privacy-restrictive US regulator, state or federal
- OFAC and Van LoonAmericas · Sanctions · where the law found a limit
- US Treasury and the Working GroupAmericas · The first federal endorsement of privacy technology
Compliant by default.
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